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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Census Bureau is using differential privacy (DP) to pro-
tect confidential respondent data collected for the 2020 Decennial
Census of Population & Housing. The Census Bureau’s DP sys-
tem is implemented in the Disclosure Avoidance System (DAS)
and requires a source of random numbers. We estimate that the
2020 Census will require roughly 90TB of random bytes to protect
the person and household tables. Although there are critical dif-
ferences between cryptography and DP, they have similar require-
ments for randomness. We review the history of random number
generation on deterministic computers. We also review hardware
random number generator schemes, including the use of so-called
“Lava Lamps” and the Intel Secure Key RDRAND instruction. We
finally present our plan for generating random bits in the Amazon
Web Services (AWS) environment using AES-CTR-DRBG seeded
by mixing bits from /dev/urandom and the Intel Secure Key RD-
SEED instruction, a compromise of our desire to rely on a trusted
hardware implementation, the unease of our external reviewers in
trusting a hardware-only implementation, and the need to gener-
ate so many random bits.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Privacy protections; • Theory of
computation → Theory of database privacy and security; •
Software and its engineering→ Software verification;
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1 INTRODUCTION
To date, most of the discussion regarding the use of differential
privacy for the US 2020 Census of Population and Housing has
focused on the impact of DP on accuracy and the suitability of DP’s
privacy guarantee (e.g. [5, 19, 36, 53, 67]), and not on the specific
details of the Census Bureau’s DP implementation.
This paper is divided into two sections. In the remainder of this
section we present the role of DP in the 2020 Census, discuss DP’s
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requirements for randomness, contrast DP’s requirements for ran-
domness with those of cryptography, and present related work.
Section 2 provides an overview of the DAS, its randomness require-
ments, and discusses the engineering challenges we encountered.
1.1 DP and the 2020 Census
As described in the 2020 Census Operational Plan [82], the 2020
Census uses data collected from households supplemented with
data from administrative records to create a dataset known as the
Census Unedited File (CUF). This file consists of “[a]ll person and
household records for the 50 states, D.C., and Puerto Rico.” [82, p.9]
This file is used to produce the Census Edited File (CEF). Following
the creation of the CEF, the respondent data travels to a purpose-
built application called the Disclosure Avoidance System (DAS).
The output of the DAS consists of two microdata sets: one con-
taining person records, and a second in which each record corre-
sponds to a housing unit or group quarters facility.
Disclosure Avoidance is a term used by the Census Bureau to
describe techniques employed to limit the risk of a disclosure of
respondent information that would be prohibited by Section 9 of
the Census Act (U.S. Code Title 13), as interpreted by the Census
Bureau’s Data Stewardship Executive Policy Committee (DSEP),
which is the Census Bureau’s executive policy-setting organ [85].
In 2017, the Census Bureau announced that it would use DP [20] as
the core privacy-conferring mechanism for the 2020 Census [25].1
As there was no off-the-shelf mechanism for applying DP to a
national census, the Census Bureau developed its own. Although
DP was created in part with the protection of a national census
in mind, the 2020 Decennial Census will be the first time that a
national statistics agency has attempted to use DP for the purpose
that it was created.
Increased transparency of disclosure avoidance processes was
an important goal in the Census Bureau’s adoption of differential
privacy. In 1990, the Census Bureau adopted a rules-based “Con-
fidentiality Edit” termed “data swapping” as a privacy protection
mechanism for the original data, and a second technique, called
“Blank and Impute,” for sample data [46]. However, no formal proof
is available that these techniques can provide meaningful privacy
guarantees against broad classes of attackers. Nor is it clear that
these privacy guarantees are not undermined by the transparent
release of implementation details. Consequently, the Census Bu-
reau has not released details concerning either the previous disclo-
sure avoidance techniques’ implementation, nor their impact on
data accuracy.
1An important subtlety is that, though it uses DP subroutines as its core privacy tech-
nology, the DAS is not end-to-end differentially private, due to the policy requirement
that a modest set of “invariant” statistics not be altered by the infusion of DP noise.
The mathematically provable privacy guarantees conferred by the DAS are weakened
by this requirement, but the DAS’s privacy guarantee is nevertheless precise and prov-
able, and is similar in form to the guarantees offered by pure DP systems.
By moving to DP, the Census Bureau gained the ability to pro-
vide formal, mathematical proof that meaningful, precise privacy
guarantees hold against broad classes of attackers, and cannot be
undermined by the transparent release of algorithm or implemen-
tation details. This allows the Census Bureau to directly and ex-
plicitly engage with data users and other external audiences, using
publicly available data, concerning the implementation details of
the DAS. This option is particularly useful for helping to explore
and address the trade-offs between privacy loss and accuracy at
various DAS parameter settings.2
In the interests of transparency, and to engage external users for
preliminary review of the DAS, the Census Bureau released the
source code for the DAS that was used for the 2018 End-to-End
Census Test [84], including 62,572 lines of Python source code and
516 lines of configuration files.
Continuing its engagement with the user community, in Octo-
ber 2019 the Census Bureau re-released data from the 2010 Census
using a prototype for the 2020 Census DAS system. Called the 2010
Demonstration Data Products (2010DDP), this system was the sub-
ject of a December 2019meeting of the Committee on National Sta-
tistics, where attendees compared the statistical accuracy of these
data products with previous data publications based on the 2010
Census [38]. The source code used to prototype the 2010DDP was
released the following month [81]. This code base included 33,853
lines of Python programs and 1263 lines of configuration files.
1.2 DP and Randomness
This article focuses on the use of randomness in, and randomness
requirements for, the 2020 DAS. We believe this is of general inter-
est as a reference implementation of a large-scale DP system.
As traditionally defined, DP is an information-theoretic require-
ment that a disclosure avoidance system must satisfy, by which
we mean that DP makes no assumptions about computational lim-
itations of attackers; moreover, analyses of specific DP algorithms
are most often carried out in real-valued arithmetic and assume
access to truly random variables, ignoring the practical subtleties
of floating-point arithmetic and random number generation. The
use of pseudo-random number generators is of special concern
in this article: using a pseudo-random number generator implies
that the information-theoretic privacy-loss budget may be larger
than claimed, as pseudo-random iterates are not independent in
the strict sense required by information-theoretic definitions. To
help overcome this obstacle, computationally aware adaptations
of DP have been developed that acknowledge and accommodate
the use of cryptographically secure pseudo-random number gen-
erators (CSPRNGs) by modeling adversaries as computationally
bounded [52]. This is a common assumption when designing prac-
tical cryptographic systems. Hence, implementations and interpre-
tations of differentially private algorithms can in principle bemade
consistent with the use of a pseudo-random number generator.
2Readers familiar with the DP literature may note that many DP systems induce er-
ror distributions which are “data-independent,” and can therefore be analyzed even
without the use of public data sets as a proxy for sensitive data. Although the DAS
generates a large number of estimators with data-independent error distributions, the
error distributional properties of the MDF are necessarily data-dependent—a side ef-
fect of the policy requirement that the DAS generate nonnegative estimates (which is
a single component of the policy requirement that the DAS generate microdata, that
can be readily manipulated by Census systems “downstream” from the DAS).
We shall take up this issue in Section 2.6.
1.3 Comparing DP and Cryptography
DP grew in part from ideas in cryptography, and the application of
such ideas to the formalized study of privacy, so it is not surprising
that there are many parallels between DP and cryptography:
• Applications in both fields have well-defined secrets that
need to be maintained indefinitely.3
• Both require strong (pseudo-)randomness guarantees, and
ready access to random numbers.
• Side-channel leakage is a threat to implementations of both
kinds of systems.
• Failures are hidden: it’s hard to distinguish working systems
from compromised systems.
• Both consider securitymodels in which the attacker has full
access to the system’s source code, and, depending on con-
text, may consider attackers with arbitrary prior distribu-
tions that can fully Bayes’ update (i.e., who possess unlim-
ited expertise, side information, and computational power),
or attackerswho face computational bounds, orwhose back-
ground knowledge is in some way limited.
• Given the complexity of algorithm design and requirements
for correct implementations, end-users should generally re-
frain from creating their systems, and instead use algorithms
and implementations developed and vetted by experts.
DP and cryptography also have some important differences. Of
particular note, the DP threat model is somewhat different from
common cryptography threat models. A common cryptography
threat model involves three parties: the message sender (“Alice”),
themessage receiver (“Bob”), and the eavesdropper (“Eve”). TheDP
threat model, by contrast, has just two parties: the message sender
and the message receiver, who is also the adversary.4
Indeed, a fundamental insight of the DP literature is that, when
guarding against general adversaries,5 every novel release based
on confidential data leaks some information about that confiden-
tial data to the recipient: if too many queries are answered too
accurately on a confidential database, this necessarily reveals all
of the confidential database’s contents. This observation is some-
times called “the Fundamental Law of Information Recovery.”6
3Note, however, that in DP, the meaning of “secret” is more subtle, and it is only the
“usual” semantic interpretation of the privacy guarantee that does not weaken over
time, while some alternative privacy guarantees smoothly degrade as more external
knowledge is accumulated.
4Although a reviewer of this manuscript noted that Private Information Retrieval
seems to have a similar threat model, in that there are also just two parties, in PIR
the goal is for the second party to learn nothing about the stored information. DP’s
goal is more nuanced.
5That is, without making special assumptions about the knowledge or computational
capacity of attackers.
6As of this writing, there seem to be several different theorems that might qualify for
this name: all share the property that if too many queries from a given class can be
asked by an attacker, with some pre-specified bounds on the noise infused into the
query answers before release, then the attacker will be able, with high probability,
to reconstruct exactly all bits in the underlying database. The theorems differ in the
structure of queries used by the attacker, and in the convergence rate—i.e., the num-
ber of queries required to achieve reconstruction. As a practical matter, the query
classes treated in these theorems generally differ from those actually released in prac-
tice by national statistical agencies. This may be little comfort, given recent, concrete
demonstrations of high-efficacy reconstruction attacks.
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Put anotherway, a factor complicatingDPover traditional secret-
key cryptography is that the information that is intentionally re-
leased (or “leaked”) in a DP system is related to the information
that needs to be kept confidential (though learning one from the
other may require specific background knowledge). For example,
the “aggregate statistics” intentionally released as part of the De-
cennial Census necessarily leak some information about the values
of individual Census responses—indeed, were the DP tabulations
released in the Decennial Census not functions of the sensitive
data, theywould be useless. Thus, the use of DP is similar to the use
of property-preserving encryption schemes [54] or functional en-
cryption schemes [9], such as order-revealing encryption [18], in
that making the protected data more useful also inherently makes
it more revealing of the very private information that the tech-
nique seeks to protect.
This difference in threat models is natural, as DP’s central moti-
vation is quite different from the traditional application of secret-
key cryptography: rather than seeking to restrict the access of unau-
thorized parties to confidential information while enabling com-
plete access by authorized parties, the goal of the commonly un-
derstood DP semantics7 is instead to propose a formal definition
for what kinds of attacker inferences qualify as privacy-eroding, and
then to quantify how much of this private information is leaked
when using a given algorithm to achieve a targeted level of accu-
racy in a statistical publication.
In the use-cases considered byDP, the typical expectation is that
the amount of information an attacker gains from the data release
should be non-zero, so that the released tabulations can be useful;
the privacy loss incurred by individuals as a result of the release
must also be non-zero. DP allows for the privacy loss to be pre-
cisely defined, quantified, and sharply bounded.
While practical cryptography deployments assume computation-
ally bounded adversaries, DP research often focuses on semantic
interpretations with a strictly stronger adversary. The commonDP
semantic interpretation assumes an attacker that is computation-
ally unbounded with arbitrarily sophisticated algorithms (specif-
ically, they can fully Bayes’ update), and has access to arbitrary
“auxiliary knowledge” (e.g., from external data sets, or from di-
rectly knowing a data subject) for use in making inferences about
the data subject.
The most common semantic guarantee given in the DP litera-
ture is a promised bound on how much more any fixed attacker can
learn about any fixed property of a data subject from a differentially
private publication based on confidential data than would have been
possible had that data subject’s information never been collected in
the first place. As a simple, concrete example, this interpretation
of the privacy guarantee justifies statements such as: “For small ϵ ,
after a release of data based on a differentially private mechanism,
an attacker’s confidence that you are of Voting Age cannot be very
much larger than it would have been had the same data release
been performed but without your data included.”
Put a bit more tersely, we can summarize this by saying that the
risk of an attacker learning anything about you (or, in fact, anyone
7“Semantics” is a common term for formal interpretations given of one of the several
precise privacy guarantees that can be shown to hold when using a DP disclosure
avoidance algorithm.
else) is about the same (for small ϵ), regardless of whether you
participate in data collection. This upper bound increases smoothly
as the privacy-loss “budget” parameter (ϵ) increases8 .
In secret-key cryptography there is typically only one bound
that is relevant: the attacker should be able to make inferences
about an encrypted message’s contents no better than they could
have without seeing the encrypted message in the first place. In
this restricted sense, information-theoretic cryptographic guaran-
tees correspond to the special case of the guarantee intended by DP
systems when ϵ = 0. This statement comes with two caveats: first,
it ignores the previously discussed differences in attacker mod-
els. Second, standard cryptographic guarantees are better identi-
fied with non-standard DP semantic guarantees, rather than the
usual DP guarantees. DP guarantees typically compare attacker in-
ference after a release to attacker inference in a world where a data
subject did not participate, whereas cryptographic guarantees are
more strongly related to DP semantics that compare attacker infer-
ence after a release to attacker inference before the release. Guar-
antees of this kind are more demanding9 and necessarily degrade—
though smoothly—as more auxiliary knowledge is gathered,10 un-
like the usual DP guarantees (except when ϵ = 0) where they corre-
spond to the usual information-theoretic secrecy promises desired
for encrypted messages.
Because ϵ = 0 implies that released tabulations will be useless,
deploying and using a DP system inherently involves making and
understanding social choices and economics. Setting the privacy-
loss budget (ϵ) fundamentally requires making a trade-off between
the usefulness of the data release and preserving confidentiality.
The data custodianmust determine the cost of leakage and the ben-
efit of tabulation release at a given accuracy. How best to resolve
this trade-off is necessarily a policy question; algorithm designers
can help to provide more efficient algorithms, with higher accu-
racy for a given ϵ , but the “correct” choice of ϵ is not a question
that can be resolved through design of better algorithms. The cen-
tral research question in much of the DP literature is, therefore,
whether there are more efficient mechanisms that have more sta-
tistical utility for the same ϵ .
This paper focuses on a property DP shares with cryptography:
the need for large amounts of high-quality random numbers. For
use of DP in large-scale applications, randomness requirements are
driven not by the memory footprint of the underlying microdata,
but by the number and scale of output tabulations published. In the
DAS’s case, the randomness required is further driven by the need
to build intermediate “histograms”—counts of synthetic records of
all possible types—in order to readily convert DP statistics into
microdata, and to provide some (typically small) expenditure of
8It is notable that there is no finite ϵ at which these bounds become meaningless;
they always impose some non-degenerate bound on attacker learning. However, they
do become loose quite quickly as ϵ grows, as the bounds depend exponentially on ϵ .
In cases where a small ϵ cannot be justified, alternative semantic statements can be
made that apply with smaller bounds, but only by qualitativelyweakening the privacy
guarantee—for example, we may have to compare an attacker’s beliefs relative to a
world in which only a portion of a person’s data record was not used, rather than
their entire record not being used.
9These guarantees essentially involve considering the change before collecting any
data, not just if a single person’s data had not been collected.
10The reason for this is that auxiliary knowledge can involve learning about prob-
abilistic dependence (or correlation, colloquially) between distinct persons’ records,
which allows for improved inference about a target person, using information con-
cerning other persons’ records.
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privacy-loss budget on even arbitrarily complex statistics of the
true data. Thus, while the data for the Decennial Census can be
stored in a few tens of gigabytes, protecting its output statistics
will require the DAS to use roughly 90TB of random data.
1.4 Related Work
1.4.1 Historical Roots. The history of random numbers is lit-
tered with the corpses of methods that were known not to be truly
random when they were deployed but were incorrectly thought to
be good enough for the task at hand.
Tippett published a book of random numbers for use by com-
puters11 in 1927 [77]. Following in this tradition, the RAND Cor-
poration published A Million Random Digits with 100,000 Normal
Deviates in 195512 [66]. During production, RAND discovered that
the “electronic roulette wheel” built for generating the numbers
exhibited statistical bias and required adjustment prior to publica-
tion [1]. Such books of random numbers pose two practical prob-
lems: the sequence is available to anyone who has a copy of the
book, making the numbers unsuitable for security or privacy appli-
cations. And since the book is printed, the numbers are not easily
available for use by electronic computers.
Indeed, early electronic computing efforts at LosAlamos required
large quantities of random numbers implement Stanislaw Ulam’s
“Monte Carlo Method” [50]. Early computers did not have an in-
tentional source of usable randomness, so von Neumann invented
the “middle-square” method, which generates a stream of digits by
starting with an n-digit integer, squaring it, and then extracting
the middle n digits [87]. von Neumann recognized that the result-
ing sequence of digits, while seemingly randomly, were entirely
predictable. Reflecting on this contradiction, von Neumann wrote:
“Anyone who considers arithmetical methods of producing
random digits is, of course, in a state of sin. For, as has been
pointed out several times, there is no such thing as a random
number—there are only methods to produce random num-
bers, and a strict arithmetic procedure of course is not such a
method.” [87]
1.4.2 Statistical requirements for randomness. Everymodern sta-
tistics package provides facilities for generating seemingly random
values. Typically these numbers are drawn from a specific distri-
bution such as a uniform distribution, a Gaussian distribution, or
some other named and well-studied distribution. Internally, mod-
ern statistics packages implement a pseudo-random number gen-
erator (PRNG) that takes a single value as a seed and emits a se-
quential series of numbers, qualitatively similar to von Neumann’s
method but typically with a longer period. As with von Neumann’s
method, if the same seed is provided for two runs, those two runs
will present the same sequence of random values. This measure
of repeatability is useful when developing statistical programs be-
cause it allows for regression testing.
In 1998, Matsumoto et al. introduced the Mersenne Twister, a
fast pseudo-random number generator based on a linear congru-
ential generator with a period of 219937 − 1. Known as MT19937,
11That is, human computers [32].
12RAND’s book also found uses outside of computing: “a nuclear submarine comman-
der kept a copy of the book with him to chart courses during evasive maneuvers.” [3].
the generator was widely adopted—for example, it was adopted by
the popular Python NumPy numeric library.
In 2007 L’Ecuyer and Simard introduced TestU01 [45], a collec-
tion of 144 statistical tests for random number generators, mostly
gathered from the literature, and developed three test suites for
randomness: SmallCrush, Crush and BigCrush. . MT19937 failed
the linearity tests of Crush and BigCrush, which are specifically
designed to detect linear generators.
In July 2019, the Python NumPy scientific library 1.17.0 was re-
leased, with an upgraded random number system that allows the
use of pluggable “bit generators” to produce the random distribu-
tions. This allows any source of seemingly random bits to be used
for generating a sequence of seemingly random integers in a given
range or floating-point numbers that match a desired distribution.
In this way, questions of speed, reproducibility, and even suitabil-
ity for operation in a parallelized environment are pushed from
NumPy down to the design and implementation of the bit gener-
ator. NumPy version 1.19 includes support for four bit generators:
MT19937, PCG 64 [58, 86], Philox [69], and SFC64 [17].
1.4.3 Cryptographic requirements for randomness. Most mod-
ern cryptographic systems are based onKerckhoffs’s principle, that
the design should be public and all of the security provided by the
system should reside in the secrecy of the cryptographic key. As a
result, cryptographic applications require sources of randomness
to create unguessable keys.
The underlying rationale for using Kerckhoff’s principle is that
strength of a secure systems depends both on the strength of the
algorithm and on the inability of the attacker to determine the data
protection key. Algorithms are hard to design and, once deployed,
they are hard to replace. Keys, in contrast, should be relatively easy
to change. So it makes sense for most cryptography users to rely
on algorithms and implementations that have been publicly devel-
oped and vetted, for the simple reason that most users lack the
resources to do as good a job.
Eastlake et al. [22, 23] extensively documents the requirements
for randomness in modern computer systems.
Cryptography researchers have spent considerable effort devel-
oping and analyzing random number generators [30, 68]. A com-
mon design is to create an entropy pool, which is typically imple-
mented as a buffer into which entropy from some source of per-
ceived randomness is added through a bit-mixing function, and
from which bits are extracted through the use of a cipher or cryp-
tographic hash function.13
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) adopted the
ANSI X9.17/X.931 standard for Financial Institution Key Manage-
ment (Wholesale) in 1985. The standard presented a design for a se-
cure pseudo-random number generator that combines timestamps
with a statically keyed block cipher to produce the pseudo-random
output. This design was widely adopted, even though it obviously
requires that the static key be kept secret.
13For readers unfamiliar with an the term entropy pool, imagine a jar filled with red
and blue marbles that is periodically stirred by the computer’s background tasks.
When a programwants random numbers, a mechanical arm reaches into the jar, caus-
ing additional mixing, and emerges with a fistful of random bits. These are read in
sequence and then returned to the jar.
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Cohen et al. performed a “systematic study of publicly avail-
able FIPS 140-2 certifications for hundreds of products that im-
plemented the ANSI X9.31 random number generator, and found
twelve whose certification documents use of static, hard-coded keys
in source code, leaving the implementation vulnerable to an at-
tacker who can learn this key from the source code or binary” [12].
One conclusion of the study is that certified implementations of
cryptographic systems are not necessarily secure implementations,
and that even professional programmers make mistakes when it
comes to implementing random number generators, even when
they are following a widely used standard.
Other attacks have been found against the ANSI X9.31 standard
(e.g. [40]), demonstrating that the mere fact that an algorithm has
been standardized does not imply that it is secure.
Reviewers of the Census Bureau’s initial decision to use Intel’s
Secure Key (ISK) as the sole source of randomness cited the experi-
ence with ANSI X9.31 as an example of why it is important to build
systems that do not have a single point of failure—for example, by
using multiple sources of entropy and by frequently reseeding the
system’s CSPRNG.
1.4.4 Non-determinism in Linux. Although the EDVAC, the ED-
SAC, and other computers designed in von Neumann’s time were
intended to be deterministic machines—the occasional moth no
longer being of concern given the field’s transition to electronic
tube technology—modern computers have many sources of non-
determinism. Weaver et al. identified “operating system interac-
tion [12], program layout [13], [1], measurement overhead [14],
multi-processor variation [15], and hardware implementation de-
tails [13], [16]” as potential sources of non-determinism [88]. (Note:
references in the Weaver quotation refer to those in Weaver [88],
not the references in this paper.) However, Das et al. suggested
that it is a mistake to use such sources for security purposes, in
part because they are either insufficiently unpredictable, or they
are susceptible to manipulation [14].
Nevertheless, there has been considerable attention to the use
of such non-determinism as a source of entropy for entropy pools,
the most prominent example probably being the Linux Random
Number Generator (LRNG).
Müller authored a 196-page report analyzing the LRNG in ker-
nels 4.10 through 4.20 and 5.0 through 5.5 [75]. Müller’s assess-
ment states “[t]he goal of the assessment is to determine whether
the Linux-RNG is able to provide 100 bits, the threshold defined by
[TR021021], of entropy early after a system boot” and concludes:
“Applying the general Linux-RNGentropy heuristics, the Linux-
RNG significantly underestimates the available entropy...This
allows the conclusion that when the getrandom system call
unblocks, sufficient entropy has been accumulated to be avail-
able for use cases with strong cryptographic requirements.
The measurements of the available entropy during boot for
virtual environments and native hardware hardly differ. Thus,
the conclusion is equally applicable to both environments.
“It is important to note that this conclusion is only applica-
ble to environments with a high-resolution time stamp. Hard-
ware architectures with a low-resolution time stamp will not
have significant amounts of entropy after boot.” [75]
The Amazon Elastic Map Reduce Kernel used by the Census Bu-
reau is Linux 4.14.128, and so it is covered by Müller’s report. The
source code for the version 4.14.128 kernel’s random device can be
downloaded from https://git.kernel.org/pub/ scm/ linux/kernel/git/ stable/ linux.git/ tree/drivers/ char/ random.c?h=v4.14.128.
The Linux
4.14.128 kernel’s random device is ©2017 by Jason A. Donefeld and
is 2343 lines long, of which 658 lines are comments, addressing
some of the concerns previously raised by Gutterman et al. [33].
The Linux kernel maintains two entropy pools: a larger pool
that receives entropy from the top-half of the kernel using the
_mix_pool_bytes function, and a smaller entropy pool that receives
bytes mixed in using the fast_mix function that is called during
system interrupts serviced by the bottom half of the kernel.14
Pseudorandom bytes are extracting by running the CHACHA20
stream cipher [55] over a portion of the larger pool, which the
source code claims creates a CRNG (cryptographicaly strong ran-
domnumber generator). (The Linux version 3 kernel extracts bytes
using the SHA-1 cryptographic hash function; Linux stopped using
SHA-1 in version 4.8.)
We tested the r5.24xlarge AWS Linux VMs used by the Census
Bureau and found that the systems’s gettimeofday() system call had
microsecond resolution, in that we were able to observe single mi-
crosecond increments in the time returned by the system call as it
was repeatedly called from a tight loop in a C program.
RedHat Linux provides two device interfaces to the randomness:
/dev/urandom, which is the output of the ostensible CSPRNG,15
and /dev/ random, which maintains a counter of the amount of en-
tropy that has been added to the entropy pool and blocks if there
is not sufficient entropy remaining until more entropy has been
added.
The random device exports four interfaces that are meant to be
called from other parts of the kernel to add entropy:
add_device_randomness() adds information such as “MAC
addresses or serial numbers, or the output of the RTC (real
time clock)” that are “likely to differ between two devices.”
add_input_randomness() adds randomness from user input,
such as mouse movements or keyboard strikes.
add_interrupt_randomness() adds randomness from the in-
terrupt layer
add_disk_randomness() adds randomness based on the disk
seek times.
At this point, the reader may be concerned that a Linux kernel
running in a data center may lack a sufficient source of entropy, at
least immediately following system start-up:
(1) MAC addresses and serial numbers are predictable, as is the
output of the RTC.
(2) There is no mouse or keyboard on servers in a data center,
so these are not sources of randomness.
(3) Hardware interrupts during the boot process are predictable.
(4) Disk seek times are predictable on systems equipped with
solid-state drives, a fact noted in the source code.
14The “top-half of the kernel” refers to the code that is invoked by system calls, while
the “bottom-half of the kernel” is the portion that is invoked in response to hardware
interrupts. Although the terms are widely used and appear in the kernel source code,
we were unable to find a suitable reference to their origin
15We say “ostensible” not because we doubt whether /dev/urandom’s use of
CHACHA20 constitutes a CSPRNG, but because we are aware of no formal proof
of /dev/urandom’s security properties.
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The Linux source code acknowledges this possibility, and pro-
vides a small script that saves 512 random bytes from /dev/urandom
into the file /var/run/random-seed at system shutdown, and then
copies this file back into /dev/urandom at system startup. The source
code recommends that these shell scripts be used to preserve the
entropy pool between reboots. But this approach does not work
with Amazon’s Elastic Map Reduce (EMR): since virtual machines
are cloned from a master image, there is no ability for each VM to
have its own, unique entropy pool carried in the file /var/run/random-
seed between system reboots. This is, in fact, the very situation that
Müller’s report attempts to address!
Recognizing that the data center needed an improved source of
randomness, Linux added support for CPU-based hardware ran-
dom number generation in 2018 [80], as discussed in §1.4.7.
1.4.5 Hardware RandomNumberGenerators. An alternative ap-
proach to using machine randomness is to generate random num-
bers using an external entropy source. Such an approach based on
the movements of the liquid within a Lava Lamp and captured by a
digital camera is described by Noll et al. in US Patent 5,732,138 [56].
The Internet hosting company Cloudflare famously has a wall of
Lava Lamps in its office and uses them to seed the allegedly cryp-
tographically secure pseudo-random number generators that the
company reports using in its Internet services [44], and has more
recently developed an entropy service that mixes entropy from
five sources in different countries, using a combination of Lava
Lamps, seismic sources in Chile, environmental noise, extraterres-
trial noise, and other sources [10, 15].
We attempted to evaluate whether Lava Lamps in fact provide
sufficient randomness for DP after a Census Bureau official sug-
gested using them as a source of randomness.
Lava Lampswere invented in 1963 by EdwardWalker, and gained
popularity in the 1970s. The lamps use an incandescent light bulb
to heat blob of wax inside another material. As the wax heats up,
it moves upwards through the liquid, at which point it cools down
and descends. The wax blob’s movements are governed by ther-
modynamically controlled microcurrents and is often regarded to
represent a chaotic system, because small variations in energy dis-
tribution resulting from micro-fluctuations of the power line and
in the air surrounding the lamp are amplified and result in unpre-
dictable movements of the wax. US Patent 5,732,138 conjectures
that Lava Lamps are “chaotic systems,” and states that the patent
could be implemented “for example, by taking pictures of a mov-
ing freeway, clouds, or lava lamps” [56]. However, a conjecture in
a patent is not scientific validation. It is also unclear if the patent’s
invention requires that the functioning Lava Lamp be a chaotic
system in the formal sense of that phrase, and not merely an un-
predictable system. In any event, we were informed by a Census
Bureau safety officer that Lava Lamps are prohibited from the US
Census Bureau’s Suitland, MD, headquarters due to fire-safety con-
cerns. Fortunately, thermal noise is also present at the atomic level,
and its use there does not constitute a fire hazard.
Another approach is to rely directly on quantum mechanics as
a source of randomness. ID Quantique introduced such a true ran-
dom number generator in 2001; the device has most recently been
reduced to a silicon chip for inclusion in 5G smartphones [39]. Los
Alamos National Laboratory partnered with Whitewood Security
to create the Entropy Engine [24, 37], a hardware random number
that plugs into a PCI Express slot and can generate 350 Mbit/s of
true random numbers.
In January 1999, Intel announced that the forthcomingPentinum
III microprocessor would include a hardware true random number
generator (TRNG) and a unique processor serial number (PSN) in
each chip. The TRNG implementation sampled thermal noise 32
bits at a time into a shift register which was then processed with
SHA-1. So long as a few bits of the noise change from moment-to-
moment, the output of the SHA-1 function is thought to be unpre-
dictable. Reviewing Intel’s published design, Guttmanwarned that
the generator could fail without detection [34, p.238].
Before the Pentium III’s random number generator could be sub-
ject to further analysis, its PSN was attacked by privacy activists
and, eventually, a legislative panel of the European Union [13]. Un-
der pressure, Intel removed the PSN from the “Taulatin” (130nm)
version of the Pentium III and it was not present in the Pentium
IV. The random number generator was on the same section of the
chip as the PSN, resulting in the loss of the TRNG as well. However,
updated versions of both returned (with little fanfare) in the “Ivy
Bridge” (22nm) series of Intel’s Core processors (Core i3, i5 and
i7) [62]. The updated PSN is now termed the PPIN (Protected Pro-
cessor Identification Number). The updated randomnumber gener-
ator, code-named Bull Mountain Technology, now has the official
name Intel Secure Key [49] (ISK).
1.4.6 Intel Secure Key. In this section we review the extensive
documentation regarding Intel’s hardware random number gener-
ator, and discuss the controversy surrounding its adoption.
Intel states that the design requirements for a random number
generator (RNG) is that each new value be statistically independent,
that the numbers be uniformly distributed, and that the sequence be
unpredictable, in that “an attacker cannot guess some or all of the
values in a generated sequence. Predictability may take the form
of forward prediction (future values) and backtracking (past val-
ues)” [49].
The Intel “Digital Random Number Generator” (DRNG) is im-
plemented as a module that is separate from the cores on Intel’s
multi-core chips. The hardware entropy source is a noisy asyn-
chronous self-timed circuit that outputs a random stream of bits at
3 GHz. The hardware entropy source feeds into a hardware AES-
CBC-MAC based “conditioner” to “spread” the “entropy sample
into a large set of random values.” It is not a conventional entropy
pool, in that the contents are flushed with every random draw.
Intel provides two unprivileged user-level instructions for ac-
cessing the DRNG: RDSEED and RDRAND [48]. Both instructions
are available in 16, 32 and 64-bit versions that allow seemingly ran-
dom bits to be stored in the designated destination register.
The RDSEED instruction passes the output of the AES-CBC-
MAC based conditioner through a “non-deterministic random bit
generator” that is compliant with NIST SP 800-90B and C (drafts)
(as of November 17, 2012) and provides the bits directly to the
caller [49]. According to Intel, “RDSEED is intended for seeding
a software PRNG of arbitrary width.”
The RDRAND instruction causes the output of the AES-CBC-
MAC based conditioner to be used as an input for a AES-256 cir-
cuit operating in CTRmode. The RDRAND instruction draws from
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the output of the AES circuit, with an upper-bound of 511 128-
bit samples being used for each random seed. Intel states that this
is a “cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator”
(CSPRNG) that is compliant with NIST SP 800-90A.16
Intel uses the terms multiplicative prediction resistance and ad-
ditive prediction resistance to describe the difference in security be-
tween the RDSEED and the RDRAND instructions. We could find
no other reference for these terms, so we provide Intel’s:
“The numbers returned by RDSEED have multiplicative
prediction resistance. If you use two 64-bit samples with mul-
tiplicative prediction resistance to build a 128-bit value, you
end up with a random number with 128 bits of prediction re-
sistance (2128 × 2128 = 2256). Combine two of those 128-bit
values together, and you get a 256-bit number with 256 bits
of prediction resistance. You can continue in this fashion to
build a random value of arbitrary width and the prediction
resistance will always scale with it. Because its values have
multiplicative prediction resistance, RDSEED is intended for
seeding other PRNGs.
“In contrast, RDRAND is the output of a 128-bit PRNG
that is compliant to NIST SP 800-90A. It is intended for appli-
cations that simply need high-quality random numbers. The
numbers returned by RDRAND have additive prediction resis-
tance because they are the output of a pseudo-random num-
ber generator. If you put two 64-bit values with additive pre-
diction resistance together, the prediction resistance of the
resulting value is only 65 bits (264 + 264 = 265). To ensure
that RDRAND values are fully prediction-resistant when com-
bined together to build larger values you can follow the pro-
cedures in the DRNG Software Implementation Guide on gen-
erating seed values from RDRAND, but it’s generally best and
simplest to just use RDSEED for PRNG seeding.” [48]
TheDRNGmonitors its outputusing Online Health Tests (OHTs)
and Built-In Self Tests (BISTs) and shuts the system down if the out-
put of the DRNG fails to meet statistical quality tests. As of 2014,
the system could produce a maximum of 800 MB/sec of random
data, an upper bound for all threads and all cores on the CPU. Be-
cause of this limit, if a random value is not available, the RDRAND
and RDSEED instructions set the CPU carry flag (CF) if the re-
turned value is actually random; otherwise CF is set to zero and
the destination register is cleared. Intel recommends that applica-
tions calling RDRAND attempt 10 retries when in a tight loop if
either instruction returns and CF is not set. For RDSEED, Intel rec-
ommends that a PAUSE instruction be inserted in the retry loop,
and a maximum of 100 retries be performed. It is not clear what a
program should do when the retry limit is exceeded.
Intel notes that RDSEED is not available on all processors, and
that it can be simulated on such processors that have RDRAND by
using RDRAND to generate 512 128-bit samples and cryptographi-
cally mixing the results to assure that one of the values was a fresh
value from the DRNG and not the result of AES counter mode.
16As with the Linux random number generator’s use of CHACHA20, the claim that
Intel’s use of AES constitutes a CSPRNG is not, as far as we are aware, supported by
formal proof. Instead, the security of AES is justified by the fact that decades of study
has failed to discover significant vulnerabilities in it.
1.4.7 ISK Adoption and Controversy. In 2012, Cryptography Re-
search (a consulting firm that was highly respected in the cryptog-
raphy community) conducted an independent review of the DRNG
and concluded “the Ivy Bridge RNG is a robust design with a large
margin of safety that ensures good random data is generated even
if the ES [Entropy Source] is not operating aswell as predicted.” [35]
In 2015, Shrimpton and Terashima presented “A Provable-Secur-
ity Analysis of Intel’s Secure Key RNG” at EUROCRYPT [74] and
concluded that the security guarantees offered by Intel Secure Key
“tell a mixed story:”
“We find that ISK-RNG lacks backward-security altogether,
and that the forward-security bound for the “truly random”
bits fetched by the RDSEED instruction is potentially worri-
some. On the other hand, we are able to prove stronger forward-
security bounds for the pseudorandom bits fetched by the
RDRAND instruction.” [74]
ISK generated considerable controversy in the Linux commu-
nity. Hardware random number generators would seem ideal for
providing a source of randomness in a data center, especially if one
boots virtual machine snapshots as is the case with Amazon Web
Services. For this reason, the Linux kernel includes the functions
arch_get_random_seed_long() and arch_get_random_long() to re-
turn hardware-generated randomnumbers. On Intel-based systems,
these functions gateway to the RDRAND instruction, and the out-
put of that instruction is added to the Linux entropy pool.
Nevertheless, by 2013 there was already broad knowledge of ISK
within the Linux community and a growing desire on the part of
some developers to use it, while a reluctance on the part of others
to do so. After all, ISK could not be readily audited, because it was
implemented in silicon. In 2013, a petition on change.org requested
that Linux remove the use of the RDRAND instruction from the
/dev/ random device. The fear was that a hardware backdoor might
give Intel, and perhaps other organizations, the ability to predict
its random output.
The concern over ISK is similar to concerns that were raised re-
garding the adoption of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Ran-
dom Bit Generator (Dual_EC_DRBG) in NIST SP800-90, “Recom-
mendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators (Revised)” [8]. The Dual_EC_DRBG algo-
rithm depends on several pre-specified constants, and the way that
those constants were created can make the algorithm vulnerable
to attack. The summer that Dual_EC_DRBG was proposed, con-
cerns were raised that there might be a “secret backdoor” in the
standard [70]. In 2013, those concerns about Dual_EC_DRBG were
confirmed [60]. NIST responded by issuing guidance stating “NIST
strongly recommends that, pending the resolution of the security
concerns and the re-issuance of SP 800-90A, the Dual_EC_DRBG,
as specified in the January 2012 version of SP 800-90A, no longer
be used.” [41]17 A 2015 article by the Director of Research at the
National Security Agency described the agency’s “failure to drop
support for the Dual_EC_DRBG” after vulnerabilities were identi-
fied in 2007 as “regrettable.” [89].
17To avoid this sort of problem, other algorithms that require constants sometimes
rely on a so-called “nothing-up-my-sleeve number,” in which the number is chosen
from a well-known mathematical sequence, such as the decimal expansion of π . For
example, the SHA-2 Secure Hash Algorithm uses the square roots and cube roots of
small primes for its constants.
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Linux’s inventor Linus Torvalds refused to remove support for
RDRAND from the kernel, because RDRAND’s entropy is mixed
into the Linux entropy pool, and not used to replace the Linux en-
tropy pool. Torvalds responded to the change.org petition:
“Short answer: we actually knowwhatwe are doing. Youdon’t.
“Long answer: we use rdrand as one of many inputs into the
random pool, and we use it as a way to improve that random
pool. So even if rdrand were to be back-doored by the NSA,
our use of rdrand actually improves the quality of the random
numbers you get from /dev/random [78].
Torvalds’s comments were supported by the comments of Linux
engineer Theodore Y. Ts’o, who noted: “I am so glad I resisted pres-
sure from engineers working at Intel to let /dev/ random in Linux
rely blindly on the output of the RDRAND infrastructure. Relying
solely on an implementation sealed inside a chip and which is im-
possible to audit is a BAD idea.” [79].
Nevertheless, the petition’s requestwas ultimately implemented
in the Linux kernel. In August 2018, the Linux v1.19-rc1 release
candidate kernel included a flag that allowed the kernel to be com-
piled without support for RDRAND [11, 80]. (We note that even
if kernel support for RDRAND is disabled, the instruction can still
be accessed from user-level programs, since use of the instruction
does not require privilege.) And in 2019, the Linux kernel added
“sanity checking” to the output of the hardware random number
generator, after the discovery that the hardware random number
on some AMD-based systems stopped providing random values af-
ter a suspend/resume cycle [43, 61].
In June 2020, Ragab et al. published an attack called CrossTalk
that allows one user-level process running on an Intel-based com-
puter to eavesdrop on the output of the RDRAND instruction run
in another process by observing the Intel CPU’s shared “staging”
buffer [65]. This attack is not relevant to the DAS, since we assume
that no unauthorized software is running in the Census Bureau’s
secure computing environment. However, some systems running
ISK have now been patched to address this issue. After the patch is
applied, RDRAND reportedly generates random values with only
3% of its unpatched performance.
1.4.8 Use of RDRAND in Statistical Soware. The Python pro-
gramming language adopted MT19937 as its default random num-
ber generator in Python 2.3 and still uses it for version 3.8, the
3.9.0b1 release candidate, and the Python 3.10 development tree.
The documentation notes “Warning: The pseudo-random genera-
tors of this module should not be used for security purposes. For
security or cryptographic uses, see the secrets module.” [64] The
Python secrets module includes a function SystemRandom which
calls the Python function os.urandom() as a source of randomness;
on Linux systems this reads from /dev/urandom, which (as noted
above) may incorporate entropy mixed-in from RDRAND. (Note:
because it can block and will supply only a small number of ran-
dom values, /dev/randommay not be appropriate for use in produc-
tion statistical software.)
As noted above, the Python numpy numeric package now pro-
vides for user-supplied randombit generators. Thus, it is now straight-
forward to combine modern versions of Numpywith an RDRAND-
based bit-generator such as Sheppard’s randomgen [72]. This is
a non-standard mode of operation, and requires that randomgen
be separately downloaded. We analyzed randomgen.RDRAND’s be-
havior and source code. We verified that NumPy run in this config-
uration is in fact using randomgen.RDRAND by running on an 2011
MacBook Air laptop and observing that the NumPy random num-
ber generator raised an exception, as the MacBook Air’s processor
lacked the ISK. However, our analysis of the randomgen.RDRAND
source code revealed that, as of July 9, 2020, it did not check the
Carry Flag (CF) as recommended in Intel’s software implementa-
tion guide [26]. This implementation error was reported to Shep-
pard and it was promptly corrected.
We also analyzed the source code for the Python Package Index
(pypi) rdrand model version 1.5.0 [76] and found that it did prop-
erly implement the CF check.
1.4.9 Randomness Requirements for DP. As noted above, DP’s
requirements for the quality of randomness sources are similar to
the corresponding requirements in cryptography.
Because pure DP’s definition is stated information theoretically,
pureDP is inconsistent with the the use of a PRNG, even aCSPRNG.
Mironov et al. introduced several computationally-aware DP vari-
ants, in which attackers are assumed to face clearly defined compu-
tational bounds (and so can no longer fully Bayes’ update); these
attacker restrictions are similar to those used in the definition of
a CSPRNG. “The good news is that a DP mechanism coupled with
a [cryptographically secure] PRNG will satisfy the stronger defi-
nition of the two. This is the theoretical underpinning for conve-
niently ignoring the issue of (information-theoretic) DP vs compu-
tational DP” [52].
Dodis et al. considered the impact of an imperfect randomness
source on the privacy guarantees offered byDP by comparing them
to the privacy guarantees associatedwith using such a randomness
source to generate cryptographic keys [16]. The authors also dis-
cuss the impact of using “infinite-precision” mechanisms that rely
on an infinitely long random tape in {0, 1}∗ and discuss how to ap-
proximate it with a tape that offers randomness of finite precision.
However, as the randomness sources modeled in Dodis et al. are
incomparable to CSPRNGs, they are not directly relevant to use of
CSPRNGs in the DAS.
The impact ofmathematical precision on the privacy guarantees
of DP was taken up byMironov’s 2012 paper [51], which presented
an attack that allowed the compromise of underlying confidential
data due to “irregularities of floating-point implementations of the
privacy-preserving Laplacian mechanism.” The attack is effective
because, in some settings, the differences between IEEE floating-
point representations and arithmetic can cause the least significant
bits of certain queries to leak much more information about indi-
viduals in the confidential database than the information-theoretic
definition of DP implies—i.e., these differences cause the actually
achieved ϵ to be much larger than the ϵ claimed on the basis of
interpreting floating-point implementations of probability distri-
butions as equivalent to their real-valued descriptions. This theme
is further explored by Gazeau et al. [28].
2 RANDOMNESS IN THE 2020 DAS
This section provides an overview of the 2020 DAS, discusses its
requirements for randomness, and then discusses how those re-
quirements are achieved.
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2.1 Overview of the DAS
The 2020 DAS is a Python-Spark (pyspark) application deployed
on an Amazon Elastic Map Reduce (EMR) cloud-computing cluster.
EMR runs on top of Amazon Linux, with nodes being configured
to run either the pyspark driver program, or as pyspark workers.
Currently DAS is running on EMR version 5.25.
The Amazon EMR: Amazon EMR Release Guide [7] details all of
the version numbers of the open source Apache software used by
each EMR release, but it does not mention the version of Amazon
Linux on which the release is based. Although it is possible to run
EMRwith a custom AmazonMachine Image (AMI) [2], the Census
Bureau is using a standard AMI, specifically Amazon Linux AMI
release 2018.03, which identifies itself as “amzn” and is based on
RedHat Fedora.
2.2 Operation of the DAS
The operation of the 2020 DAS has been described by the Census
Bureau in other publications, including an overview presented to
the Census Bureau’s Scientific Advisory Committee [25], the pub-
lished design specification for the DAS [83], and a draft academic
article describing the so-called TopDown Algorithm (TDA) [4].
Briefly, the algorithm runs twice to produce privacy protected
microdata: once, to produce the table containing person-level mi-
crodata, and a second time to produce the table containing micro-
data for housing units and group quarters facilities. For each ta-
ble, a histogram of counts is computed at each geographic level
for the United States that is described by the Census Bureau’s geo-
graphical “spine” (currently the US as a whole, the states and D.C.,
the counties and county equivalents, the census tracts, and the
blocks). Each of the cells of each of these histograms, as well as
a set of queries chosen to reflect the to-be-published Census tabu-
lations, is then protected using an existing DP mechanism “using
the Laplace mechanism [21], Geometric Mechanism [31], or more
advanced techniques such as the high dimensional matrix mech-
anism [47].” [4] These protected values are called the “noisy mea-
surements.”
Next, the algorithm performs two optimizations on the US-level
histogram18 subject to external knowledge constraints (e.g., that
state-level population totals must not be noisily perturbed): the
first optimization minimizes squared error to the DP estimates of
the histogram cell and query values, while requiring that the out-
put be a non-negative, floating-point-valued estimate of the true
histogram.19 The second optimization pass forces all counts to be
integers, performing a variant of controlled rounding while main-
taining external knowledge constraints.
Following the US-level optimization, the algorithm performs a-
nalogous optimizations in which the counts in the US-level his-
togram are allocated to the state-level histograms, while minimiz-
ing differences between the counts assigned to the states and the
counts computed from the noisy measurements within each state.
18Data for Puerto Rico is processed using a separate pass of the same algorithm.
19That is, this optimization imposes non-negativity and self-consistency as require-
ments: after this optimization is complete, all queries on the microdata can be cal-
culated based off of it, and the estimates attained will be unique. This circumstance
does not hold for the initial DP measurements, where we may, for example, have an
estimated total population that is not the sum of the estimated white alone and not-
white-alone populations.
Once again, this is a two-step optimization process. This process
then repeats for every geographic node in each geographic level of
the geographical hierarchy until all counts are distributed to indi-
vidual Census blocks. Finally, each block’s histogram is expanded
into the microdata that the histogram specifies. This process is re-
ferred to as post-processing in someCensus Bureau presentations.20
These optimizations provably do not violate the guarantee pro-
vided by TDA’s use of differentially private mechanisms, although
the use of invariants in this post-processing does, as we previously
commented, imply that the achieved privacy guarantee is qualita-
tively weaker than it would be under pure DP.
The application of DP is a relatively small but essential part of
the TDA: the DP subroutines in use by the DAS tend to be much
simpler and faster than those used by the DAS for optimization-
based post-processing. However, it is essential for the DP mecha-
nism to be correct, as these are the principal source of the DAS’s
privacy guarantees. Among other considerations, this means that
acquiring suitable high-quality randomness is necessary for the
DAS to achieve its purpose.
2.3 Randomness Requirements for the DAS
We estimate the randomness requirements for the DAS by observ-
ing that the privacy mechanism starts by computing a histogram
of counts for every geographical unit at every geographical level.
(In practice, each “run” of the DAS actually consists of two distinct
runs: one for the persons table and one for the housing unit/group
quarters facility table. For each of these runs the DAS usually ma-
nipulates two histograms simultaneously—a principal histogram
concerned with variables that heavily interact with one another in
published tabulations, and a much smaller histogram featuring a
small set of variables that mostly do not interact with those in the
main histogram. For simplicity we ignore this much smaller his-
togram in our descriptions and calculations here. Additionally, our
calculations focus on the histograms rather than individual queries,
as the histograms dominate the randomness requirements by or-
ders of magnitude, and the queries can change from run to run,
depending on configuration file specifications.) We compute the
total number of bits for both runs of the top-down algorithm for
the United States (but not for Puerto Rico, which is run separately)
in Table 1 and find it to be a minimum of 90TB of random data.
Table 1 modestly underestimates the randomness requirements be-
cause the final DP workload includes not just each histogram cell,
but additional queries of summary statistics (some of which have
not yet been determined).
2.4 Threat Models
In deciding upon the source of randomness for the DAS, the de-
velopment team engaged in several threat modeling exercises. We
assumed that an attacker would have access to the entire DAS soft-
ware and hardware stack, including the actual implementation of
the TDA used to generate the published statistics, the Python run-
time environment, the Linux operating system, the same hardware
20This use of the term post-processing is a reference to the technical use of the same
term in the DP literature, where the “post-processing property” refers to a straightfor-
ward but important result: that the DP guarantee cannot be undermined by perform-
ing further processing on the output of a DP algorithm, so long as the confidential
data is not directly accessed in doing so.
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Total # Random Bits = 64 × (Total # protected histogram cells)
= 64 × (|Hp | + |Hu |)(#дeounits)
= 64 × (|Hp | + |Hu |)
∑
Ggeolevels
= 64 × (|Hp | + |Hu |)(Gnat +Gstate equivs +Gcounty equivs +Gtracts +Gblock groups +Gblocks)
= 64 × ((42 × 2 × 116 × 2 × 63) + (2 × 9 × 2 × 7 × 4 × 2 × 522))(1 + 51 + 3,143 + 73,782 + 217,550 + (∼ 8,000,000))
≈ 7 × 1014bits (≈ 90TB)
Where |Hp | = Size of the person-level histogram
|Hu | = Size of the unit-level histogram
Glevel = The number of geounits at geolevel level
Figure 1: Randomness requirements for the US run of the 2020 DAS, including 50 states and the District of Columbia. Geog-
raphy counts for county equivalent and tracts taken from 2010 Census. It is estimated that there will be 8 million habitual
blocks for the 2020 census.
on which the DAS had been run, and detailed information of the
network configuration. We assumed that the attacker would have
all data publications produced from the confidential data, and that
the attacker could combine these publications with significant ex-
ternal knowledge. For example, we assumed that an attacker was
likely to know the rough age, race and sex distributions of every
community in the U.S., since the Census Bureau already publishes
this information as part of the American Community Survey. We
also assumed that the attacker has unbounded mathematical skills
and computational capabilities, although we did assume that the
attacker could not crack AES-256.
Except as otherwise noted, however, we exclude most risks per-
taining to the correctness of software and hardware implementa-
tions. That is, we assume that attackers do not have access to the
systems on which the TDA is running, as this would give the at-
tacker access to the underlying confidential data, rendering moot
DP’s privacy protections. We likewise assume that Linux kernel
on which the TDA executes matches the source code for the Linux
kernel that we reviewed.
2.5 MT19937 and DP
Because MT19937 is the default PRNG in Python and was the de-
fault Numpy RNG prior to Numpy 1.17, MT19937 has been widely
used in DP demonstrations. Indeed, MT19937 was used in the ini-
tial prototype implementation of the DAS.
It is inadvisable to use MT19937 in a production system that is
intended to protect confidential data: though MT19937 has a large
period of 219937 − 1, MT19937 has substantial security vulnerabili-
ties.
MT19937 maintains its internal state as a vector of 624 32-bit
unsigned integers, and its output can, as a byproduct of this, be
predicted after observing just 624 output iterations. Indeed, there is
publicly available source code that implements this attack (e.g. [57]),
and there are several user-friendly blog posts outlining how to per-
form a variant of this attack [29, 63, 71].
In an application like the DAS, which requires protecting large,
sparse histograms, the vast majority of the protected histogram
counts are the result of taking true counts of zero and adding noise
derived from sequential draws of the RNG. Thus, if an attacker
knows that certain populations are not present in a geographic
area, the attacker can immediately infer the noise iterates from
viewing the DP query estimates. This situation is problematic if
MT19937 is used, as it reduces the security of the implementation
to the difficulty of inverting Laplace or Geometric distribution ran-
dom draws: if these can be inverted, the attack on MT19937 can be
carried out, and the DP guarantees unravel entirely for geographic
units where the necessary auxiliary knowledge is available.
For the 2020 Census, the Census Bureau is in fact considering
the release of the so-called “noisy measurements,” or the raw val-
ues, of each cell in each histogram after the noise has been added,
as these enjoy in principle the same privacy guarantees as the fi-
nal microdata. The histograms being considered for the DAS are
currently 217,550 and approximately 8 million cells. Since the vast
majority of these cells are likely to be zero, if MT19937 is used, an
attack of this kind may be quite practical. Here is a sketch:
• This attack relies on finding a run of 313 cells known to
correspond to true counts of zero, and being able to invert
the noise algorithm such that the output of the MT19937
algorithm can be determined. With these output values, the
internal state of the MT19937 engine is then determined.
• The internal state is validated by running the MT19937 al-
gorithm two steps forward to determine the next 64 output
bits. The 64 output bits predict the contents of the 313th cell.
If the 313th cell matches the prediction, then the internal
state of the MT19937 algorithm is validated.
• Once the state is validated, the amount of noise that was
added can be inferred for every other cell in the histogram,
and the privacy protection mechanism is undone.
This attack requires being able to transform a 64-bit noise value
into two successive 32-bit draws, which may require some addi-
tional thought and computation to achieve, so this attack is not
immediately practical. Nevertheless, it is not desirable for the se-
curity of a DP implementation to rely on the difficulty of invert-
ing noise-distribution sampling functions, which are not designed
with security in mind. Thus, it is clear that MT19937 is inappropri-
ate for production DP applications. We believe that only CSPRNGs
should be used for production privacy applications.
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2.6 Developing the DAS
During initial efforts to develop the DAS, the development team
discussed whether or not it would be desirable to have a “repeat-
able” source of random numbers to support regression tests [27].
Initial efforts to create a repeatable sequence failed: the research
team discovered that Apache Spark’s scheduler was non-determin-
istic, and that the same workload might be scheduled simultane-
ously onmultiple nodes if therewere available resources. Although
there was discussion that the random seed could be made depen-
dent upon the geographical unit, ultimately it was decided that
this was unnecessary; instead, approximate repeatability could be
achieved by caching the DP measurements and building function-
ality to re-load from them, as this functionality would be required
for other purposes regardless.21
The DAS development team turned its attention to the Python
random number generator in the early part of 2018. Learning of the
problemswithMT19937, but unwilling to create its own implemen-
tation of the Laplace or exponential distribution random samplers,
the initial work-around employed was to reseed the MT19937 gen-
erator with a read of /dev/urandom on every scalar draw. This
proved to be unacceptably slow as the scale of problems the DAS
needed to address increased beyond what was required for early
testing.
TheDASdevelopment teamwas familiar with the Intel RDRAND
instruction and learned that Intel had developed its own Python
distribution which made use of hardware acceleration on the In-
tel platform. The team assumed that the Intel Python distribution
adopted RDRAND for use in the Numpy RNG, but it had not.
Intel also created mkl_random, “a NumPy-based Python inter-
face to Intel (R) MKL [Math Kernel Library] Random Number Gen-
eration functionality” [42, 59]. This software was installed on the
DAS development clusters and used for the 2018 Decennial Cen-
sus End-to-end test. However, additional testing revealed several
implementation flaws,22 causing the 2020 DAS development team
to stop using the software.
2.7 Randomness and the 2020 DAS
Although Müller would seem to be the final word on the subject,
theDASdevelopment teamhad concerns about using /dev/urandom
as the sole source of randomness for the privacy mechanism of the
2020 Census. Our first concern was that it was surprisingly dif-
ficult to verify that the version of /dev/urandom that Müller had
reviewed was the same version that the DAS team was running,
as there is no obvious mechanism for verify the integrity of mod-
ules that make up a kernel running in the AWS environment. Our
second concern validating whether or not the entropy seed of the
AWS device might be inadvertently replicated as part of the clus-
ter boot process. Our third concern was performance: there is only
a single /dev/urandom device and corresponding entropy pool for
each AWS kernel, creating a single-threaded bottleneck in our oth-
erwise parallelized implementation.With 96 cores per cluster, such
a bottleneck might adversely impact performance.
21Caching the DPmeasurements in fact ensures exact repeatability, except for a small
degree of non-auditible non-determinism that can occur in the Gurobi Optimizer (e.g.,
when using it in a mode where multiple optimization algorithms are deployed in par-
allel, terminating when the first such algorithm terminates), on which the DAS relies.
22See https://github.com/IntelPython/mkl_random/issues
The alternative to using /dev/urandom is to implement a user-
level CSPRNG. Such a CSPRNGcould be seeded from /dev/urandom
or from a suitable source of hardware entropy.
Two sources of hardware entropy in the AWS environment are
the ISK (on appropriately equipped systems) and a network-acces-
sible hardware security module for generating cryptographically
strong random numbers that Amazon provides [6]. Amazon’s ser-
vice is part of the AWS Key Management Service (KMS), which is
an integrated system for managing and using both symmetric and
asymmetric keys and encryption algorithms. We tested the KMS
GenerateRandom and determined that it generates 1024 bytes at a
time, and has a round-trip-time of approximately 0.5 seconds per
invocation, for a maximum single-threaded, non-pipelined perfor-
mance of 2KiB/sec. Although we could find no documented con-
cerns regarding the operation of the KMS and have no reason to
not to trust the quality of its entropy, we could also find no reason
to trust it other than an appeal to Amazon’s authority.
Intel’s documentation states that the DRNG can produce ran-
dom data at the rate of 800 MB/sec per CPU chip. Current CPU
chips have faster clock rates and more cores, but it does not ap-
pear that the DRNG has been improved significantly or that it is
no longer shared between cores. Assuming that today’s chips have
the same DRNG unit and the CrossTalk patches have not been ap-
plied, a single Intel chip could produce the required randomness to
protect the 2020 Census using the Census Bureau’s DPmechanism
in 90 × 1012 ÷ 800 × 106 ≈ 112, 000 seconds, or 31 hours.
Of course, the Census Bureau is not running the TDA on a sin-
gle CPU. Currently, the TDA runs on AWS r5.24xlarge virtual ma-
chines. These systems report 96 cores each arranged in 8 12-core
Intel Xeon chips. For an EMR cluster with 20 workers, there will be
160 DRNGs, allowing the required randomness to be computed in
about 700 seconds, or about 12 minutes. (Sheppard observed that
faster times might be achieved with the same level of security by
using the RDSEED instruction to seed a software random number
generator based on AES run in counter mode—essentially a soft-
ware version of RDRAND without the periodic reseeding [73].)
Given the extensive analysis that the ISK has received, and given
the simplicity of accessing it with a single user-level machine in-
struction, the DAS team originally planned to simply use RDRAND
as the source of all randomness for the TDA. This approach was
discouraged by outside reviewers, who stressed that a silicon-only
implementation could not be audited. Some reviewers suggested
that the Census Bureau rely on the Linux /dev/urandom device
exclusively as the source of randomness, arguing that it already
mixes in entropy from RDRAND, as well as from other sources
such as hardware interrupt timing.
The Census Bureau performed a speed test of /dev/urandom on
the AWS r5.24xlarge server in AWS GovCloud US-West region and
found that a single-threaded dd process could retrieve pseudo-ran-
dom bytes at the rate of roughly 200 MB/sec, or one fourth the
rate of RDRAND. However, the /dev/urandom device is effectively
single-threaded, as there is only one entropy pool and it is pro-
tectedwith a lock. Four concurrent dd processes on the same server
retrieved bytes from /dev/urandomwith data transfer rates between
52MB/sec and 54 MB/sec each, the slight performance boost likely
coming from parallelization of the user-level dd code.
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On a 96-core machine with 8 CPUs, the 8 ISK devices are able
provide amaximum throughput of 6400MB/sec—32 times the band-
width of random data than can be provided by the /dev/urandom
device. On an EMR cluster with 20 worker nodes, this raises the
amount of time required to produce the randomness to 8 hours,
which was deemed to be unacceptable.
The Census Bureau’s current solution is operate a user-level
CSPRNG based on AES-CTR-DRBG that will be seeded from user-
level calls to RDSEED mixed with output from /dev/urandom. The
output of this CSPRNG will used as a bit generator for NumPy. Al-
though this effectively runs 96 CSPRNGs per r5.24xlarge system,
resulting in a significant performance boost, higher rates of reseed-
ing will lower performance to themaximum rate atwhich RDSEED
can provide such seeds. Thus, the performance of this arrangement
is tunable, and those tunings have not yet been decided.
The DAS development team has determined that AES side chan-
nel and timing attacks are not of concern in this circumstance,
since all software running on the virtual machine is trusted, the
use of r5.24xlarge VMs assures that there are no other tenants
on the physical hardware, and precise timing information will not
be available to potential attackers. Nevertheless, the DAS will use
an AES implementation that employs the native AES acceleration
instructions provided by Intel’s microprocessors to prevent side
channel attacks.
3 CONCLUSION
The need to generate a large number of high-quality random num-
bers is a largely unrecognized requirement of a production dif-
ferential privacy system. Many DP tutorials and texts assume the
availability of high-quality floating point random numbers taken
from the Laplace, geometric, or exponential distribution. In prac-
tice, these examples use MT19937 or PCG64. These algorithms are
not CSPRNGs and should not be used to protect confidential in-
formation. Because this important detail may not be obvious to
developers looking for a DP implementation, we recommend that
DP tutorials and texts discuss this issue and use CSPRNGs as their
randomness sources.
The prototype implementation of the 2020 DAS used MT19937
as seeded by /dev/urandom on a cluster of 96-core Linux servers. Af-
ter the DAS development team learned that MT19937 is not secure,
the team changed theDP primitives to use Intel’s RDRAND instruc-
tion as the source of randomness, as accessed through the Python
mkl_random library. To avoid relying on the ISK as a single source
of randomness, and after discovering thatmkl_random is based on
the closed-source Intel Math Kernel Library, the DAS team pivoted
to using a user-level random bit generator based on AES-256 and
seeded by the Linux /dev/urandom mixed with bits from the RD-
SEED instruction. Throughout the process, the DAS team found it
necessary to review multiple randomness implementations down
to the level of assembler code, and found several software quality
issues and implementation errors, some of which are discussed in
this paper.
The Census Bureau is now four years into the process of mod-
ernizing its disclosure avoidance systems to incorporate formal pri-
vacy protection techniques. This process has proven to be challeng-
ing across disciplines. Beyond the 2020 Census, the Census Bureau
intends to use DP or related formal privacy systems to protect all
of its future statistical publications.
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